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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this appeal, Joseph Mobley has challenged the district court's provision of a 
"dynamite instruction" in response to a question from the jury in his case that reflected 
the jury was deadlocked on one of the charges and did not know how to proceed. This 
Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contentions on appeal with regard to this 
claim. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Mobley's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court violate Mr. Mobley's right to due process when the court provided 
the jury with a "dynamite" instruction upon being informed that the jury was deadlocked 
as to one of the counts in this case? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Violated Mr. Mobley's Right To Due Process When The Court 
Provided The Jury With A "Dynamite" Instruction Upon Being Informed That The Jury 
Was Deadlocked As To One Of The Counts In This Case 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Mobley asserts that the transcript in this case - which is presumptively 
correct and has been certified as such by the court reporter - reflects that the dynamite 
instruction provided by the district court was submitted to the jury prior to Mr. Mobley 
being afforded the opportunity to object and prevent this error. Accordingly, because a 
contemporaneous objection was not possible under the record of the proceedings in this 
case, Mr. Mobley asserts that the standards for fundamental error should not govern 
this Court's review. 
However, even if this Court were to apply the standards for fundamental error to 
this claim, Mr. Mobley asserts that he has demonstrated that this instruction amounted 
to a fundamental error requiring reversal of his conviction. 
B. The District Court Violated Mr. Mobley's Right To Due Process When The Court 
Provided The Jury With A "Dynamite" Instruction Upon Being Informed That The 
Jury Was Deadlocked As To One Of The Counts In This Case, And This Error 
Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error 
As an initial matter, the State asserts in this appeal that there exists some latent 
ambiguity in the transcript of the proceedings, which reflects that the district court 
provided the improper dynamite instruction at issue prior to affording Mr. Mobley the 
opportunity to object to this instruction. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-17; Respondent's Brief, 
pp.5-8.) The primary basis for the State's claim is a selected portion of the minutes 
from Mr. Mobley's trial which indicates that a written response from the court was sent 
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back to the jury following the court's request for any objections on the part of trial 
counsel. (R, p.81; Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) 
Mr. Mobley respectfully submits that the transcript in this case - being both a 
certified document of the proceedings and accorded a presumption of correctness on 
appeal - is the controlling record in this case. "The transcript in any case certified by 
the reporter shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the testimony taken 
and proceedings had." State v. Wallace, 116 Idaho 930, 932 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis 
added). The transcript in this case, unlike the trial minutes, was certified as a "full, true, 
and accurate record of the proceedings had," in this case. (Trial Tr., p.336.) 
Accordingly, to the extent that the minutes from this proceeding and the trial transcript 
may reflect inconsistent information, it is the trial transcript - as the document certified 
by the court reporter as accurate - that would be entitled to the presumption of 
correctness. 
However, Mr. Mobley also asserts that, even if this Court applies the test for 
fundamental error to his case, he has demonstrated fundamental error in the court's 
improper exhortation to the jury to continue to deliberate. 
First, and contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, the use of dynamite 
instructions in Idaho has been rendered per se inadmissible on constitutional grounds. 
See State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806, 810-813 (1988). In adopting this rule, the Flint Court 
first noted the constitutional underpinnings of its holding - that, "the constitutional 
guarantee of due process demands that an accused person receive a fair and impartial 
trial. This guaranty is violated if jury deliberations are tainted by undue pressure." Id. at 
810 (quoting State v. Clay, 112 Idaho 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1987)). In response to this 
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constitutional demand, the Court thereafter held that, "[o]nly a blanket prohibition 
against dynamite instructions will sufficiently protect deadlocked jurors from coercion." 
Id. at 812. 
Although the State appears to argue that the United States Supreme Court has 
rejected a per se prohibition against dynamite instructions on constitutional due process 
grounds, this argument overlooks the fact that the Flint Court was already aware this 
was the case when it rendered its decision, but opted to provide heightened 
constitutional due process protections when it comes to protecting the sanctity of jury 
deliberations in the face of potential coercion. In fact, the Flint Court cited directly to the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Allen v. United States 1 and acknowledged that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had approved the use of dynamite instructions. State courts are free to 
establish heightened constitutional protections, rather than proceed in lockstep with the 
holdings of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 
10 n.6 (1985). Accordingly, Mr. Mobley submits that the Flint Court has already 
recognized that the constitutional right of due process, as embodied in both the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, requires this 
per se prophylactic rule against the use of dynamite instructions to overcome an 
otherwise deadlocked jury. 
Additionally, in arguing that the district court's instruction in this case was not 
coercive, the State draws primarily on the rationale of two cases - State v. Timmons, 
141 Idaho 376 (Ct. App. 2005) and State v. Byerly, 109 Idaho 242 (1985). The State's 
reliance is misplaced. First, this case and Timmons are readily distinguishable. 
1 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 
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Second, because the Idaho Supreme Court has overruled the Byerly opinion in Flint on 
the very grounds being advanced by the State on appeal, the Byerly opinion no longer 
reflects an accurate statement of the legal standards attendant on this Court's review. 
As is set out more fully in the Appellant's Brief, in Timmons, the jury never 
indicated a definite split on any of the charges and the presiding juror affirmatively 
informed the district court that a verdict could be possibly reached with continued 
deliberations. Timmons, 141 Idaho at 376-377 (see also Appellant's Brief, pp.19-21.) 
Here, in contrast, the court was informed that the jury was actually split on one of the 
charges, and there was no additional information that would indicate that further 
deliberations could resolve this split. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls. 6~12.) Moreover, as is also 
noted in the Appellant's Brief, the jury in Mr. Mobley's case was solely exhorted to 
continue deliberating with the aim of reaching a verdict. They were not told to consider, 
along with this directive, the corollary that no juror should surrender his or her honest 
opinion as to guilt or innocence solely because the majority feels otherwise or just to 
obtain a verdict. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-12; Instruction 28; see also Appellant's Brief, 
pp.19-21.) 
Additionally, contrary to the State's apparent interpretation, the opinion in Byerly 
was not overruled in Flint on grounds independent of the analysis of the permissibility of 
the dynamite instruction- Flint overruled Byerly on those grounds. ( See Respondent's 
Brief, p.9.) The Flint Court noted within its Opinion that it had previously approved of 
the giving of dynamite instructions within the case of State v. Bailey, 94 Idaho 285 
(1971). Flint, 114 Idaho at 811. Thereafter, the Court in Flint noted several subsequent 
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opinions that relied upon Bailey in sanctioning the use of dynamite instructions at trial. 
Id. The opinion in Byerly was expressly listed as one of Bailey's "progeny" - the cases 
in which a dynamite instruction was improperly given sanction. Id. Following the 
Court's explanation of why it was adopting a per se prohibition against the use of 
dynamite instructions, the Flint Court then further held that, "we overrule State v. Bailey, 
and its progeny:' Id. at 812 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the standards from 
Byerly as to when a dynamite instruction is permissible under due process principles -
rooted as they are in the Bailey Opinion - are no longer good law in Idaho and the 
State's reliance thereupon is misplaced. Id.; see also Byerly, 109 Idaho at 243-246. 
With regard to the State's claim that the record is inadequate to discern whether 
the failure to object was a tactical decision, Mr. Mobley respectfully submits that the 
right to a jury free from coercive influences is not subject to the tactical whims of 
defense counsel. As previously noted in the Appellant's Brief, the right to a jury trial is 
personal to the defendant alone and cannot be waived as a strategic matter by trial 
counsel. See, e.g., State v, Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 742 (Ct. App. 2003) (see also 
Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22). In fact, the right to a fair and impartial jury is bedrock to the 
right to a fair trial itself. See State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 506, 601 (Ct. App. 1992). As 
was noted by the United States Supreme Court, "it is the law's objective to guard 
jealously the sanctity of the jury's right to operate as freely as possible from outside 
unauthorized intrusions improperly made." See Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 
377, 382 (1956). Accordingly, because Mr. Mobley's right to a jury trial - in its 
substance - subsumes a right to a fair and impartial jury free from undue outside 
influence, and because trial counsel is not empowered to waive this right for the 
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defendant as a matter of strategy, Mr. Mobley asserts that the failure to object to the 
coercive instruction provided by the trial court could not be deemed proper trial strategy. 
See State v. Day,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d __ , 2013 WL 264548, *4 (2013).2 
Last, Mr. Mobley asserts that he has demonstrated a reasonable possibility that 
this error affected the outcome of the trial in his case. The State appears to argue in 
this case that, because the jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Mobley of only one of the two 
charges following the improper dynamite instruction, that Mr. Mobley cannot establish 
prejudice because he cannot establish whether the dynamite instruction may have 
prompted the conviction, as opposed to the acquittal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) 
However, this argument misapprehends the legal standard of what constitutes a 
"reasonable possibility" that the error contributed to the verdict. See State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 226 (2010). 
The recent Idaho Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Day is instructive on this 
issue, as a similar argument as to the harmlessness of the error was raised and 
rejected in that case. See Day, 2013 WL 264548, *5. The primary issue in Day was 
whether the jury instructions provided by the district court constituted a variance that 
impermissibly permitted the jury to convict the defendant for conduct that did not 
constitute the underlying criminal offense. Id. at *1-5. Similar to this case, the State in 
Day argued that, because it was possible that the jury could have convicted solely for 
conduct criminal under the statute, the defendant could not establish a reasonable 
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at *5. 
2 As of the writing of this brief, the decision in Day is not yet final and has not been 
released for publication in the permanent law reports, and therefore is subject to further 
revision or withdrawal. 
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The Day court rejected this argument as misstating the burden of a defendant 
with regard to the prejudice prong for fundamental error. Specifically, the Day couIi 
reasoned, " ... Perry does not require that Day make such an affirmative showing. 
Rather, as Day asserts, Perry requires that Day must demonstrate there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." Id. Because it was likewise 
possible that the jury could have convicted the defendant in Day based upon conduct 
not rendered criminal under the statute defining the charged offense, the Day court held 
that the defendant had established a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial. Id. 
The same is true in this case. In acknowledging that the jury "may have" already 
reached the verdict of guilt for the domestic battery charge, and "may have" been 
pressured by the court into reaching an acquittal on the charge of attempted 
strangulation, the State is implicitly conceding that the opposite state of affairs is also a 
possibility. (See Respondent's Brief, p.11 (emphasis added).) That is, it is likewise 
possible that the judge's directive to continue deliberating with the aim of reaching a 
verdict pressured the jurors to convict Mr. Mobley of felony domestic battery, while they 
had previously decided to acquit him of attempted strangulation. Under this state of 
affairs, and under the standards articulated by Perry and Day, Mr. Mobley respectfully 
submits that he has established that a reasonable possibility that the district court's 
improper exhortation of the jury affected the outcome of this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mobley respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of April, 2013. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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